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Abstract 
In this paper, I show clear links between the theoretical underpinnings of SFL 
and those of specific sociological, anthropological, and communication research 
traditions. My purpose in doing so is to argue that SFL is an excellent interdisciplinary 
research method for the social sciences, especially considering the emergent form of 
political economy being touted by new media enthusiasts: the so-called knowledge (or 
information) economy.  
To demonstrate the flexibility and salience of SFL in diverse traditions of social 
research, and as evidence of its ability to be deployed as a flexible research method 
across formerly impermeable disciplinary and social boundaries, I use analyses from my 
doctoral research, relating these - theoretically speaking - to specific research traditions 
in sociology, communication, and anthropology. 
ASFLA 99- Phil Graham 
2 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explain why Systemic Functional Linguistics 
(SFL) is eminently suitable as a primary primary research method for the social sciences. 
To do so, I will show its theoretical relevance to, and compatability with, established 
sociological, anthropological, and communication research traditions. SFL is a 
sociologically grounded discipline. In this respects, it differs from other sociolinguistic 
traditions, which may be described as linguistics that have altered over time to take 
sociological concerns into account. SFL has developed in precisely the opposite 
direction. Halliday (1978) poses the critical question upon which my rationale also rests: 
since language is primarily an inter-organismic, or social phenomenon, ‘[h]ow else can 
one look at language except in a social context?’ (p. 10). While SFL takes a social-
systemic perspective on language, it does not treat the system as something that exists 
outside what people actually do (Halliday, 1978, pp. 10-13). This is an important 
distinction to make, both for the study of language, and for the study of social systems in 
general, from whichever perspective (Hearn, 1999). Because my research is concerned 
with an emergent form of political economy which is, as I have explained it, ‘a political 
economy of language, thought, and technology’ (Graham, 1999a), and because language 
is the primary mode of production and means of exchange within this system, a social-
systemic linguistic method is most apposite for analysing the object of such an 
investigation (1999a, p. 503).  
The recurrent problems for social research, of anthropology, sociology, and 
communication, can be divided into four broad species: problems of social classification 
in human society, or the problem of defining social classes; problems of class relations, 
or the problems concerning relations of power; problems of socio-epistemology 
concerning the research of these problems, or paradigmatic problems; and the problems 
inherent in using language to describe sociolinguistic practices in a system of political 
economy in which language is the primary mode of production and means of exchange. 
Indeed most, if not all, of these problems can be attributed, at least to some large degree, 
to language and its slipperiness, both in the social sciences, and in everyday use 
The historical meaning of social ruptures: From media content to social relations 
 New communication technologies have had historically persistent effects: the 
preservation of certain kinds of knowledge, the creation of knowledge monopolies 
specific to these knowledges, increased centralisation of power using new technologies 
as media of social control, and the eventual demise of these effects (Innis, 1950, 1951). 
In short, social ruptures are upheavals in various fields of power. Thus, social ruptures 
are the very empowerment of certain groups of people - usually the upper middle-class at 
any given time - and the disenfranchising of others. These “others” are almost always the 
economically poorest of people.1 Recent research in the United States [US], the world’s 
                                                 
1 One can find myriad assertions regarding gender, ethnicity, and so on, as being the deciding factors in 
social repression, empowerment, diempowerment, social class, and so on. This is patently false, 
misleading, and culturally myopic. The only common factor that can be consistently identified with social 
repression throughout human history is economic inequality. That this coincides, in most cases, with 
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most wealthy and powerful country, confirms this, at least in respect to the emergent 
“information economy” (US Department of Commerce [USDC], 1999). This historically 
recurrent pattern remains unchanged in the current, world-wide set of ruptures (cf. 
Graham, 1999a,c; Castells, 1998; Robins & Webster, 1999; Schiller, 1999). What has 
changed is the nature of economic, or social, value (Graham, 1999a,c,d). 
 Thus, investigating changing relations of power, or rather their social impacts, is 
an exercise in measuring how relative ‘values’ attributed to specific, exchangeable,  and 
therefore changeable, forms of ‘symbolic power’ are developed, exercised, and 
propagated (cf. Bourdieu, 1991). The current set of ruptures is often characterised in 
terms of the ‘information haves and have-nots’ (USDC, 1999, p. 14), or, in the crude, 
protofascist eugenics of today’s international economics, the ‘winners and losers’ 
apparently created by ‘globalisation’ (cf. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
[DFAT], 1997; Slaughter & Swagel, 1997).2 From this standpoint, I argue that the SFL’s 
metaphors of language as an ‘exchange of goods and services’, and even moreso, the 
emergent work on appraisal (Martin, 1998), or evaluative (Lemke, 1998), systems in 
language are invaluable in understanding and analysing the social effects of the current 
ruptures.  
Changing social relations of power implies the preeminence of new sources of 
value within society. These sources are the products of specific fields, most notably (and 
predictably) those occupied by the economic upper-middle class, who are also, generally 
speaking, the most educated (USDC, 1999, p. 14). It would be a mistake to extrapolate 
the trends indicated in the USDC report to infer the whole world is moving in the same 
direction as the US, but upper middle-class US ideas about how the world is - and how it 
should be - are having profound effects on the way many societies now operate (Castells, 
1998; Saul, 1997a,b). The global entertainment industry, the most socially influential 
sector of the so-called “information economy”, is propagating a worldview which is 
having many confusing and violent effects on societies throughout the world, including 
many within the US itself (Graham, 1999a,d). This is not a direct function of media 
“content” as such, nor is it a direct function of the extreme concentrations of wealth and 
influence that this field of production - the culture industry (Adorno, 1991; Horkheimer 
& Adorno, 1947/1998) - now commands. It is, I argue, the effect of a number of 
invisible “convergences” that the culture industry is facilitating, including its values, its 
ideologies, and the form its associated technologies are taking.  
My main point here is that, while content analyses of media products are 
necessary, they often miss the point in terms of sociological impact. For instance, the 
plot of Homer’s Iliad is, for all intents and purposes, interchangeable with that of the 
latest Star Wars episode. The form in which these narratives were and are delivered may 
also give us an idea of how certain knowledge and values were and are propagated by 
these two media products separated by thousands of years. Homeric and Ovidian epics 
                                                                                                                                                
specific physical characteristics is not surprising: these are the most obvious physical, “thingly  symptoms” 
by which people who are socially excluded are identified. In short, I see it as an easy way out of the 
problem of class.   
2 In the policy literature, globalisation is construed as a creative force, among many other other “things”. 
See my other paper from this conference proceedings. 
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required years of training on the part of the orator in the complex rythmic form of the 
verse and its contents (Innis, 1951, chapt. 2); epic film, today as always, requires 
extremely expensive equipment and thousands of people to produce it. These facts are 
somewhat more revealing than a diachronic analysis of epic content. But, if we really 
want to know about the social meaning of the medium, we must listen to what people 
say about it, and about how new media affect them. But, of course, this is not enough on 
its own, otherwise it becomes merely another interpretive account. A sociological 
analysis, to be valid and fruitful, must take into account:  
1.  The history of the discourse community, class, or field under investigation; 
2.  The symbolic, physical, cultural, and economic stakes within the field (in 
other words, what constitutes the field of power within a given field); 
3.  The language people use within the field (this may seem self-evident, but 
many people have attempted analyses with little or no knowledge of local 
language use), and; 
4.  The linguistic traditions of the field of power within any field: its sacred texts, 
intertexts, heteroglossic resources, and their traditional modes of deployment.  
In my own field of study, which is concerned with the effects of language in multilateral 
policy as it concerns information technology, I assume that, today,   
[l]anguage is no longer just a mode of social control; it is also the mode of control over 
physical systems and processes.  
The immediate impact here is the technologising of language itself. Here we have a 
direct line of evolution from the printing press to the computer, via the telephone, 
typewriter and tape recorder. (Halliday, 1993, p. 68). 
I would add to this Innis’s (1950, 1951) insight that sees a direct line - historical overlays 
of technologies, one on top of the other - from oral traditions and writing, to the original 
mixing of these in ancient Greece. Of course, we must include boats, trains, the 
telegraph, radio, and television –anything that has affected modes of social 
communication, organisation, and control, especially modes of communication 
distribution (Innis, 1950, 1951). A history of communication technologies is also a 
history of knowledge monopolies, a history of social control, and a history of social 
change. Taking such a view by no means entails a linear, deterministic view of 
communication technologies; it merely sees the operationalising of particular expedient 
choices, a series of historical accidents if you like: ‘But the pattern is a helical one … 
Mixed modes engender mixed genres’ (Halliday, 1993, p. 68). Which, I might add, are 
the direct result of mixed social effects within historically specific social domains. Quite 
clearly,  
the language of the information age will be different, both ideationally and 
interpersonally: ideationally because it participates in new techniques of production 
[and distribution PG], interpersonally because it participates in new relationships of 
power, or at least new manifestations of the power structure (p. 70). 
Indeed, for Halliday (1978), any instance of meaning-making is ‘a sociological 
event, … through which the meanings that constitute the social system are exchanged’ 
(p. 139). Language is very much constitutive of the “social mind” - what I have called 
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the sociocognitive metabolism (Graham, 1999a) - at any given time. Any instance of 
language is part of  
a continuous process. There is a constantly shifting relationship between the text and its 
environment, both paradigmatic and syntagmatic: the syntagmatic environment, the 
“context of the situation” (which includes the semantic context –and which for this 
reason we interpret as a semiotic construct), can be treated as a constant for the text as a 
whole, but is in fact constantly changing, each part serving in turn as the environment 
for the next (Halliday, 1978, p. 139). 
Here we see the relationship between SFL and social class: it emphasises the relationship 
between participants, processes, and structures. It sees that these are inseparable from 
each other, none pre-existing any of the others. Each serves as a constitutive 
environment, and a constituting element, for the other at any given time. They are 
dynamically interdependent upon each other, and are firstly processual and relational; 
they are firstly social. 
 The term “class” also implies a hierarchy – a social taxonomy, if you like. 
Taxonomies are, clearly, well-entrenched in language, and are quite probably an innate 
feature of human rationality (Halliday, 1993, p. 10). Whether this is the case or not, 
distinctions in language - ways of saying - are attributed with specific values:  
So the immediate picture of language … is one of variation in which some variables 
have social value; they are certified, so to speak, as social indices, and are attended to in 
careful speech. If we take the simplest case, that of a variable having just two forms, or 
‘variants’, then the variants form a contrasting pair of one ‘high’ and one ‘low’. 
(Halliday, 1978, p. 156)  
And this is just ‘the tip of the iceberg’ because, viewed from a particular perspective, 
‘the whole linguistic system is value-charged’ (p. 156). Social hierarchies exist within 
classes as well as between them (p. 184). These hierarchies are not objective; they fall 
within the processual, dialectical rules I have outlined above. Thus,  
[i]t would be a mistake to think of social structure in terms of some particular index of 
social class. The essential characteristic of social structure as we know it is that it is 
hierarchical; and linguistic variation is what expresses its hierarchical character (p. 
184).  
Nevertheless, certain classes - everywhere - enjoy privileges, resources, and 
opportunities that others do not. It would be remiss, to put it mildly, to ignore such 
concrete social inequalities. Here, Bourdieu’s (1991) conception of ‘symbolic power’ 
becomes invaluable.  
Social class, symbolic power, and language 
 Without assuming an objective, homogenous ‘principle of difference’, a 
universal and fixed source of socially sanctioned power within and between social 
classes, we can say that  
all societies appear as social spaces, that is, as structures of difference that can only be 
understood by constructing the generative principle which objectively grounds those 
differences. This principle is none other than the structure of the distribution of the 
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forms of power or the kinds of capital which are effective in the social universe under 
consideration – and which vary according to the specific place and moment at hand. 
This structure is not immutable, and the topology that describes a state of the social 
positions permits a dynamic analysis of the conservation and transformation of the 
structure of the active properties’ distribution and thus of the social space itself. That is 
what I mean when I describe the global social space as a field, that is, both as a field of 
forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it, and as a field of 
struggles within which agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends 
according to their position in the structure of the field of forces, thus contributing to 
conserving or transforming its structure. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 32) 
The principle of social spaces and power that Bourdieu describes here immediately 
threatens to negate itself and collapse into a “thingly” conception, precisely because of 
the abstractions upon which it rests, one of which is the word “capital”. The term 
‘capital’ lends itself to a ‘substantialist reading’, which is anathema to Bourdieu’s 
intention: various “capitals” need to be seen as relationally constituted and contested, 
whilst being constituted in such contestations (1998, p. 3). The danger of substantialism 
is offset by Bourdieu’s notion of a dynamic social topology, specific to particular social 
contexts. With this in mind, it is instructive to add a qualifying, or at least to some 
degree, clarifying distinction; a description of a particular kind of field that further 
highlights the degree of abstraction at which Bourdieu is operating here, and which 
elucidates the nature of social power:  
The field of power (which should not be confused with the political field) is not a field 
like the others. It is the space of relations of force between the different kinds of capital 
or, more precisely, between the agents who possess a sufficient amount of one of the 
different types of capital to be in a position to dominate the corresponding field, whose 
struggles intensify whenever the relative value of different kinds of capital is questioned 
(for example, the exchange rate between cultural capital and economic capital) that is, 
especially when the established equilibrium in the field of instances specifically 
charged with the reproduction of the field of power is threatened (in the French case, 
the field of the Grand Écoles). (1998, p. 34, emphasis added) 
The field of power is one amongst a network of dynamically interwoven, 
interdependent social fields, each of which have different forms of symbolic capital at 
stake. Each of these field are, for sociology, anthropolgy, and communication, merely 
perspectives that are realised only when people are doing things that reproduce these 
fields, and the kinds of capital specific to them. These kinds of capital, which are only 
valid for the fields in which they are reproduced in the tensions shaping the field at any 
given time, is ‘the very thing the struggles seek to conserve or transform’ (p. 34). Thus, 
although these fields, or classes, have their objective basis in the realities of what people 
do, they are, nevertheless, ‘a well-founded fiction’, as are the kinds of capital at stake 
within them (p. 66):  
This is the basis of the specific ontology of social categories: being rooted both in the 
objectivity of social structures and in the subjectivity of objectively orchestrated mental 
structures, they present themselves to experience with the opacity and resistance of 
things, although they are the products of acts of constitution which … apparently 
relegate themselves to the nonexistence of pure figments of thought.  
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… The near-perfect match that is then set up between the subjective and objective 
categories provides the foundation for an experience of the world as self-evident, taken 
for granted. (1998, p. 67, emphasis added). 
In other words, the “imperfect” relationship between the subjective and objective 
realities constituted by people in the practice of social spaces generates the “thinginess” 
of human social categories: once seen in their alienated form as objective “things” - 
families, weddings, businesses, schools, and so on - these “things” become invisible, 
accepted, and thus taken for granted as objective things. Here, we see the link between a 
dynamic perspective on social spaces - including the social spaces within which power is 
defined, produced, exercised, and reproduced - and subjectivity, which is itself an 
objectively constituted process that takes place, historically and socially, within the 
constraints and tensions of multiple social fields.   
The perceptual “gap” between objective actions and subjective experiences of 
these actions creates a generative dialectical tension that can only exist for languaging 
social creatures - humans - and which can only be created and bridged in language, 
another form of socially constituted and constrained action. This is the dialectical logic 
of consensual social domains, of fields, and of classes, all of which are the same “thing”. 
This same dialectical property is also the generative principle of ‘the most ruinous 
divide’ within the social sciences: the artificially contrived split between subjectivity and 
objectivity (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 25). 
Power, for instance, only becomes power when it is recognised as objective 
authority of one sort or another, usually in the form of an officially delegated 
spokesperson (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 107). That is why Bourdieu suggests that recognition 
of objective social forms is misrecognition: it is recognition in its alienated form; it is a 
recognition of  a dynamic process as a static, objective “thing”, as if it existed externally 
to what we actually do. This dialectical system of dynamic social tensions is further 
exacerbated when the field of social science begins to investigate the social sphere in 
which it is totally immersed, and in which it powerfully exerts itself:  
When scientific discourse is dragged into the the very struggles over classification that 
it is attempting to objectify (and, unless the disclosure of scientific discourse is 
forbidden, it is difficult to see how this usage could be prevented), it begins once again 
to function in the reality of struggles over classification. (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 225)  
Such is the circularity of social science. Formal and subjective schemes of classification, 
which are necesarily manifested in language, enter into the study of what language also 
creates as an objective social reality.  
Here, too, SFL, which assumes these contradictory, dialectical relationships and 
trajectories as its theoretical basis, is an invaluable, flexible research method for the 
social sciences. An SFL perspective on language assumes that  
[l]anguage is not a superstructure on a base; it is a product of the conscious and the 
material impacting on each other - of the contradiction between our material being and 
our conscious being, as antithetic realms of experience. Hence language has the power 
to shape our consciousness; and it does so for each human child, by providing the 
theory that he or she uses to interpret and to manipulate their environment. 
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But, by the same token, since language evolves out of the impact between the material 
and conscious modes of being, it follows that as material conditions change the forms 
given to language also change. Grammar construes reality according to the prevailing 
means and relations of production - or what we wrongly call ‘production’. But these are 
not constant; they have evolved through different forms at different times and places. 
(Halliday, 1993, p. 8) 
That is why ‘language is practical consciousness’ (Marx & Engels, 1846/1972, p. 122, 
original emphasis). Thus, language practices, which are always socio-historically 
specific ways of doing,  
cannot be understood outside of their historical contexts; but neither can they be derived 
from these contexts by any simple relation … language is at the same time a part of 
reality, a shaper of reality, and a metaphor for reality. (Halliday, 1993, p. 8) 
The problem of social classification: Class and class action 
 The problem of defining social class, even by taking the narrowest of economic 
perspectives, pervades sociological and anthropological theorising (cf. Cheater, 1999; 
Donham, 1999; Marx, 1981, p. 1026; Wright et. al., 1989). Marx (1981) asks the 
question explicitly: ‘What makes a class?’ (p. 1025). Unfortunately, he died before 
answering it explicitly (p. 1026). The problem has never gone away since. And, of 
course, the answer cannot be clearly defined, at least in any static, structural, or objective 
sense. That is because, even at its most well-developed, ‘class articulation does not 
emerge in pure form’ (p. 1025). The central difficulty in objectively defining class is the 
‘infinite’ sub-classifications into which any particular class or classes can be divided:  
From this point of view … doctors and government officials would also form two 
classes, as they belong to two distinct social groups … The same would hold true for 
the infinite fragmentation of interests and positions into which the division of social 
labour splits (p. 1026, emphasis added).  
Further problems emerge for objective structural analyses or definitions of class when 
one considers that people move around within and among the ‘infinite fragmentation of 
interests and positions’ that Marx identifies. But class, like capital, is not a “thing”; it is 
the dynamic result of things people do. Social classes are constituted by specific people 
doing specific things. These doings are constrained by the doings of other people who 
are engaged in the pursuit of similar or opposing interests and positions (cf. Adorno, 
1991, chapt. 1; Bourdieu, 1998; Hearn, 1999). Conversely, classes are constrained, 
defined, and enabled by the doings of people engaged in the pursuit of interests and 
positions precisely inimical to those that define a specific class. In short, class is an 
identifiable, emergent property of collective and inherently antagonistic social practices. 
These practices are counterposed, interdependent, and historically specific phenomena. 
Thus, like Thompson (1980), I understand class as 
a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected 
events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that it 
is a historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a ‘structure’, nor even as a ‘category’, 
but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human 
relationships. (p. 8) 
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So when I speak about “the Australian working class”; “the unemployed”; “the labour 
movement”; “the Ford organisation”; or “the family next door”, I am speaking about 
specific individuals living in specific relationships to each other at specific times and 
places, according to specific and definitive social criteria. These criteria - because they 
are social recognised - are necessarily delineated in language. Conversely, when I speak 
of classes, I am also speaking of these relationships of doings in a ‘negative dialectical’ 
sense (Adorno, 1973). That is, I also define classes of doings in terms of what they are 
not - most specifically, in relation to the constellation of doings to which the doings of 
any given class stand in opposition - in the social contexts in which these doings are 
embedded.  
 Many of these doings are also sayings: they are socially specific language 
practices. These relate to, and in many ways define, social classes. My own approach 
focuses on ways of defining that are specific to particular social groups, or classes, but I 
do not claim that this is the only way in which one can use linguistic analyses for the 
purposes of defining social categories. 
“Sedimentary, my dear Watson”: Processes, Things, Attributes, and Class 
Language tends towards reification and alienation, or ‘thinginess’ as Halliday 
puts it (1993, p. 11). In the main, social processes, once named, get treated as “things” 
that have an independent existence: they get nominalised and hurled about in the transit 
system of social processes (Martin, 1999). That tendency makes for considerable 
confusion because, instead of remaining part of a flexible system of thought, 
nominalised social processes tend to become perceived as “things” that stand in relation 
only to one or more established systems of reified concepts, such as in the fields of 
maths, astronomy, philosophy, econometrics, and so on. Often, these nominalised 
concepts - via legislative coercion - are given power over people (Graham, 1999a). Thus, 
they take their place as active participants in the social order, much like conceptions of 
God that, once given sufficient definition and social sanction in language, become the 
basis of institutional and bureaucratic regulatory bodies (Graham, 1999a, 1999c).  
This tendency is especially troubling for the social sciences. It leads to a 
confusion between “things” that people do, “things” that people think and say, “things” 
that people have, and the myriad other “things” that exist external to people (including 
other people and other classes of people!). For sociology, this becomes a problem when 
people carelessly collapse consensual domains. A consensual domain is a ‘specific 
system of communicative descriptions’ that are used to orient people to themes about 
particular aspects of “the world” (Maturana & Varela 1980, pp. 30-31). For instance, a 
description of a particular “something” in the world that is produced within the 
consensual domain of astronomy will differ from one produced by, for instance, a poet. 
Consensual domains are thus also socially and historically constituted domains, and they 
refer to different aspects of the world of what people do, even if they are referring to the 
same “things”. For example, an astronomer might describe the moon in terms of its 
gravity, mass, distance from the earth, velocity, and so on, whereas a poet might ‘chid 
the changeful moon/ Now rising late, and now /Because she set too soon’ (Bridges, in 
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Jones, 1940, p. 11).3 Neither the poet nor the astronomer has any reason to claim that 
their description of the moon is better or more valid than the other’s. And, indeed, each 
might well enjoy both descriptions. Further, being an astronomer does not disqualify one 
from being a poet. The point is that both ways of describing the moon have different 
social functions: they operate in different consensual domains –these consensual 
domains are produced and reproduced in different social domains or classes, or, in the 
language of Bourdieu, different ‘fields’ (cf. Bourdieu, 1990; 1991; 1998; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). Multiple consensual domains are also an intrinsic property of human 
existence (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987). When astronomers describe the moon as 
astronomers, social conventions - historically derived traditions - in the field of 
astronomy delineate the linguistic boundaries within which the moon may be validly 
described, astronomically speaking.  
But there are broader, more universalised differences in human consensual 
domains. I will divide these into three, merely for the sake of convenience (because there 
are many more subdivisions of these): the consensual domain of physical descriptions 
(descriptions of Things external to people, and the Processes that pertain specifically to 
these); the consensual domain of social descriptions (descriptions of social 
Circumstances, Participants, and Processes); and the consensual domains of descriptions 
(descriptions of Descriptions), or the domain of human self-consciousness. Conceptual 
self-reflexivity emerges in this domain. Thus it is also the domain within which the 
‘division of mental labour’ (Adorno, 1973) becomes possible, and in which social 
exchanges of meaning are negotiated. This domain entails different “orderings of 
orderings” in language, which in turn depend on the social circumstances in which these 
orderings develop historically, or more specifically, the social contexts in which they are 
produced according to their social functions.  
The messiness that naturally confronts people when attempting to describe 
people in terms of social class is further complicated by the way language tends towards 
Halliday’s “thinginess”. That is because the Attributes that are produced in different 
descriptive domains also tend to become reified (Martin, 1999). This type of thinginess 
often manifests itself in “identity politics” descriptions of social class. At the risk of 
offending any number of people committed to such ways of classifying human beings, 
which are no doubt scientific to some degree, I argue that this is a mistaken approach for 
sociology precisely because of its “thingly” basis. I argue that social classification based 
on race or gender, for instance, are fallacious and misleading. They refer to physical 
attributes that do not necessarily shed any light on what particular groups of people 
historically and specifically do together, which is really what defines social class. 
Rather, they attempt to adduce a persons’ social class by referring to what people are in 
terms of specific physical attributes. If these attributes coincide with what people do, 
then they may be useful analytical categories. But to base a sociology on arbitrarily pre-
defined physical attributes is tantamount to phrenology. Whether used in a negative or a 
positive sense, such ways of describing social class do not, at least from the perspective I 
present here, properly belong in the social sciences.  
                                                 
3 I Will Not Let Thee Go, Robert Bridges (1844-1930) 
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Other “thing”-based social typologies are also unhelpful in understanding human 
action and social class. The “thinginess” of language can cause two kinds of fundamental 
damage to social research. The first is a kind of feigned objectivity that attempts ‘“the 
formal understanding” of doing, namely that in surveying the whole, it [sociology PG] 
stands above the individual existence it is talking about, that is, it does not see it all but 
only labels it’ (Adorno, 1950/1991, p. 37, italics added). Second, and this is entailed by 
the first, thingly arrangements of concepts tend towards methodological rigidity. Thus, a 
research method can, with sufficient rigididity, become a methodology, ‘something to be 
applied to an object in a fixed unvarying manner’ (Adorno, 1999, p. 2). We can avoid 
these by emphasising the processes by which classes become classes, and by which they 
maintain themselves as such. In such a processually focused approach, method, as 
opposed to methodology, can ‘adapt itself to its object and legitimate itself by the light it 
sheds on it’ (p. 2).  
And we cannot get beyond linguistic mediations in describing social phenomena, 
if only because ‘those are the historical mediations in which the whole society is 
sedimented’ (Adorno, 1958/1991, p. 11). Charts and numbers can augment such 
distinctions, but they cannot replace them, and must, in any case, be explained in 
language –in words. However, when doing social science, we can and should remain, as 
much as possible, aware of the sedimentary tendency of language; its tendency to turn 
processes, attributes, and categories into static, objectified “things” and breathe life into 
abstract concoctions of the social mind. Here, at the very root of social science, SFL, 
which has developed to specifically address these problems, can most certainly assist the 
researcher (Halliday, 1978, pp. 202-203).   
Specific problems of class: Class, class relations, and relations of power 
 In recent years, the central dialectic driving the debate about class and class 
relations in sociology and anthropology has been the tension between the 
microsociological assumptions of vulgar postmodernism and poststructuralism, and the 
macrosociological assumptions of vulgar Marxist structuralism. In the latter accounts, 
we find, on the one hand, a ‘relations of domination’ approach to defining relationships 
between classes and, on the other, a ‘relations of exploitation’ approach (Wright, 1984, 
p. 5). Postmodernism and postructuralism also have their vulgarists, and the emergence 
of extraordinary concentrations of economic power indicates intractable inadequacies in 
such approaches. For simplicity, this dialectic can be described in terms of polar 
extremes. On the one hand, vulgar Marxism sees socially dominant power and its 
ideology being imposed upon the great mass of people from a centralised source; on the 
other hand, vulgar “postism” sees power everywhere, with a mass of “decentred 
subjects” exercising power over each other in all social situations. I do not have the time 
to engage the theoretical nuances of these debates and so will move beyond them to 
identify what I see as the most pressing problems facing the social sciences in terms of 
defining relations of power. These relations are intrinsically bound up in defining class 
itself, and thus they are of a more specific and concrete nature than the general concept 
of social class. But social class, as a useful concept, cannot properly exist without class 
relations, which are also relations of power between classes. Thus, class relations are 
intrinsic to defining class itself, because without class relations, social classes would not 
exist.  
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 In the first instance, at least for sociology and anthropology, class is an economic 
category. Class assumes the existence of different groups of people doing particular 
things at particular times. These relational doings produce regular, contradictory, and 
unpredictable effects, regardless of whether these effects manifest themselves in physical 
“goods and services”, or in specific social conditions, including socially specific ways of 
doing: ways of perceiving, saying, thinking, describing, acting, and so on. Usually, 
perhaps inevitably, they will produce both simultaneously. Thus, an economic definition 
of class need not be construed as a narrow “economism”. Such approaches only see a 
“formal” economy filled with universal classes of “things”: money, management, labour, 
machines, firms, regulatory bodies, and so on. The kind of economy I am talking about 
here refers to what people do - intentionally or otherwise 4 - to produce and reproduce 
society as a dynamic whole. Its categories, therefore, must be flexible and adaptable to 
social context and history. It concerns itself with describing how social conditions are 
produced by actions within and between classes. These classes are abstract. They can 
only be construed in terms of what the people in them do at any particular time to 
constitute themselves as a class, and what these doings stand opposed to. SFL has these 
assumptions built in at its foundations. 
Socio-epistemology: Paradigm and praxis in social science 
 As I have shown above, where the social sciences are concerned, the nature of 
social being is inherently bound up in the nature of social knowledge which, in turn, is 
bound up in language practices, a systematic set of socio-historically specific doings 
with specific (but not immutable) social functions (Graham, 1999c; Graham & 
McKenna, forthcoming; Halliday, 1993; Hearn, 1999).  
Here, I must clarify my position on two recurring issues in the relationship 
between linguistics and social science. The first is the charge that linguistics necessarily 
reduces everything to language and is thus a form of idealism (cf. Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 
105-109; Gal, 1989, p. 345). This is quite necessarily the case from a certain structuralist 
perspective:  
As soon as one treats language as an autonomous object, accepting the radical 
separation which Saussure made between internal and external linguistics, between the 
science of language and the science of the social uses of language, one is condemned to 
look within words for the power of words, that is, looking for it where it is not to be 
found … The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the 
spokesperson and his [sic] speech – that is, the substance of his dicourse and, 
inseparably, his way of speaking. (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 107)  
Within SFL, the term ‘social semiotics’ (cf. Halliday, 1978, 1993, p. 3; Hodge & Kress, 
1988; Lemke, 1995; Martin, 1998) has developed as a remedy to such perceptions of 
itself. To my mind, this is unnecessary because the fundamental principles of SFL, when 
taken fully into account, dispel the structuralist-formalist problems that Bourdieu 
identifies above. While the “social semiotics” perspective is largely a matter of 
                                                 
4 The phrase ‘consciously or unconsciously’ might be substituted here, but this would obscure what I want 
to say later.  
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terminological choice, and Halliday makes this point himself,5 I argue that the risk of 
collapsing consensual domains is much higher once the unnecessary concept of the 
“sign” or “code” is inserted as the universal mediator of meaningful human experience 
(cf. Graham, 1999e; Graham & McKenna, forthcoming; Halliday, 1993, p. 10).  
 Another recurring issue for linguistics is the false language/concept split on 
which cognitive linguistics bases many of its claims, and which also regularly appears in 
arguments about functionalism and formalism in sociolinguistics (cf. Gal, 1989; 
Graham, 1999e; Halliday, 1993, p. 3; Martin, 1998; Pinker, 1994). This false dichotomy 
is a residue of rationalism, meant here in its philosophical sense, and it ignores 
Wittgenstein’s axiomatic conclusion: ‘What we cannot speak about, we must pass over 
in silence’ (1921/1961, p. 74). Language and depth-psychological categories (e.g. Jung 
1968; Fromm, 1951) are undoubtably related, but they are related in such a way that 
these categories can only be accessed through metaphorical use of language. To put it 
bluntly, ‘nonconceptual’ “thought” - which is the product of instinct and emotion, 
among other “things” - can only be socially expressed in language, however tangentially 
(Bermúdez & Macpherson, 1998). The point at which this expression happens is the 
(necessarily strenuous) movement of non-conceptual content into pre-existing, socially 
constituted and accessible categories of concepts: the language of social life. The 
mechanics and necessity of this movement is an entirely different discussion which need 
not detain us here. Suffice it to say that concepts and language are the same “thing” for 
social science if, and only if, the social context and function of language use is 
considered in its relationship with an historically specific whole, through which the 
whole of social action is mediated. 
The paradigm of paradigms 
 Kuhn’s (1962) argument that successive scientific paradigms emerge from 
historical accidents, from something ‘first going wrong with normal research’ (p. 310), 
has given voice and validity to all sorts of ‘scientific revolutions’ (p. 311) over the last 
30 years, but the lines of most of these can be traced back to ancient Greece (Graham, 
1999c).6 But the ‘choices’ Kuhn asserts are false, the questionable concept of “normal” 
research notwithsatnding:  
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing 
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. 
Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the 
evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a 
particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, 
into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses 
its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defence. 
                                                 
5 ‘I myself do not accept the implication that the study of meaning must be grounded in some theory of the 
sign’ (1993, p. 3). 
6 For more than one reason, 1968 is the year that the social sciences began to disintegrate into their current 
state (Graham, 1999c).  
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The resulting circularity does not, of course, make the arguments wrong or even 
ineffectual. The man [sic] who premises a paradigm when arguing in its defense can 
nonetheless provide a clear exhibit of what scientific practice will be like for those who 
adopt the new view of nature. That exhibit can be immensely persuasive, often 
compellingly so. Yet, whatever its force, the status of the circular argument is only that 
of persuasion (p. 311, italics added).  
Of course, the status of circular argument is, precisely, its circularity, and thus its lack of 
validity. Kuhn’s formulation of paradigms boils down to “lifestyle choices”. If the social 
sciences are to be developed in such terms, then one opinion is as good as the next, and 
that is both unsatisfactory and untrue. At its most rigorous, paradigmatic thought 
assumes a dogmatic adherence to one of the polar extremes that paradigmatic socio-










Fig 1. Paradigmatic polarities. Adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979).  
Burrell and Morgan’s diagram (Fig. 1) shows the paradigmatic limits of epistemological 
assumptions that social scientists can make about the object of their research. Along one 
dimension is the functional/radical cline. Extreme radicalism assumes constant change 
and turbulence in society; extreme functionalism assumes constant stability, with 
different individuals merely filling roles which have the same function regardless of their 
name. Along the second dimension lies the subjectivism/objectivism cline. Extreme 
subjectivism assumes that meaning is inside individuals and so cannot be accessed in 
any general terms; extreme objectivism assumes that meaning can be studied as a 
concrete thing that exists “out there” in the object of study. The theoretical “schools” 
corresponding to the poles which I have numbered 1-4 in the diagram here are:  
1)  High-structuralist Marxism which assumes that societies are structured and change 
according to objective laws that are based on the tension between objective classes of 
people.  
2)  Parsonian or Hobbesian functionalism which assumes that society is an enormous, 
static anthropomorph, like Hobbes’s  Leviathan. Each person plays a role which has a 
ASFLA 99- Phil Graham 
15 
static function in society that can be appraised according to objective biological 
criteria (e.g. knowledge workers or bureaucrats as part of the social “brain”; labourers 
and soldiers are social “muscle”, etc).  
3)  Radical postmodernism which assumes that societies are merely collections of 
fragmented, shallow individuals, each of whom is ‘“schizo”, a mere surface screen, 
passively reflecting the image of other surfaces transmitted by information systems’ 
of one sort or another (Tetzlaff, 1991, p. 12).  
4)   Social action or symbolic interactionism which assumes that “subjects” are stable  
but that they live in entirely different phenomenal domains from one another, and 
thus interpret the world entirely differently from each other. The researcher taking this 
socio-epistemological extreme must assume that she or he is also in an entirely 
different phenomenal domain and is thus merely reporting their own interpretation of 
the world-as-it-seems (Hearn, 1999).  
Of course, it is rare that the extremes of Burrell and Morgan’s model are dogmatically 
occupied, exercised, and defended in social research. And, upon closer inspection, the 
perceived epistemologoical tensions between these extremes are largely, if not wholly, 
synthetic and illusory. Dogmatic adherence to either subjectivism (which is, in any case, 
constituted in objective social conditions) or objectivism (which is dependent upon 
subjective observations of research objects) is the result of fundamental confusion about 
the inseparability of these two perceived extremes. The main point to note here is that 
objectivism and subjectivism are categories delineated and created in language. 
Similarly, the radicalist/functionalist divide is also a false matter of socio-ontology that 
arises by its being broken away from its source, socio-epistemology: one cannot 
investigate the nature of being without the theoretical constructs of socio-epistemology. 
Further, the most troubling problems of sociology, anthropology, and communication 
research are not whether a society changes or remains the same; they are, rather, how 
social systems are produced, reproduced, and transformed, and this how cannot be 
breached in a single step. It requires an understanding of history, culture, and language 
(Das, 1998).    
Knowing and doing: SFL as method  
 While recent works in the fields of anthropology (Das, 1998), sociology 
(Silverstein, 1998), communication (Hearn, 1999; Silverstone, 1999), and political 
economy (Gal, 1989; Graham, 1999a,c,d) have highlighted the need for a language-
focused approach to these disciplines, none other than my own have taken up SFL as a 
method. Further, this trend towards a focus on language is typical of the social sciences, 
even in “dry” economics (cf. Saviotti, 1998; Engelbrecht, 1998).7 This is not surprising, 
nor is it before time. This is not the place for a full historical discussion of why a focus 
on language seems increasingly necessary for research in the social sciences; this subject 
is well-covered elsewhere and so need not detain us here (e.g. Gal, 1989; Halliday, 1978, 
                                                 
7 “Dry” economics don’t usually include social realities or people in their framework. The apotheosis of 
these is “econometrics”, a highly abstract discipline that IMF, OECD, and WTO economists use, as well as 
those at the state and national levels in Australia. 
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1993). Indeed, the more puzzling issue may be why the various fields of sociolinguistics 
have tended to detach themselves from the very disciplines from which they initially 
emerged, which are precisely the fields that concern us here (cf. Gal, 1989; Halliday, 
1978, chapt. 2, 1993, pp. 72-73).8 The short explanation as to why language is becoming 
increasingly crucial to social research is the profound social effects being wrought by the 
increasingly pervasive and intimate nature of today’s media, in whichever form they 
appear (Graham, 1999a,b,d). What follows, therefore, is an illustration of the method I 
argue for.   
Techno-corporatist discourse: An SFL-based sociology of M3 policy language9   
 In its broadest sense, the function of M3 techno-corporatist discourse (hereafter 
M3) is identical to that of advertising: it is firstly used to sell something. Thus, it is 
always used to maximise profits for somebody. Most often, the people who use this 
discourse make a virtue of its “profit maximisation” function, and so its profit motive is 
rarely hidden –in fact, this is its main recommendation. Because people use it to 
maximise profits for somebody, it makes somebody more powerful, and this is its 
primary function: it is used to sell, create, produce, define, and maintain power. In this 
sense, it is self-valorising: it adds surplus value to itself the more quickly and widely it is 
circulated. It mixes the language of business - corporate managerialism - with those of 
theocracy and technocracy, thus providing a potent mixture of historically successful 
modes of domination. The heteroglossic relations in the discourse are usually structured 
thus:  
1.  client⇔patron [action: sale/choice - relationship: the patron speaks on behalf of the 
client];  
2.  beneficiary⇔benefactor [action: give gifts/mercy/permission - relationship: the 
benefactor speaks on behalf of the beneficiary];  
3.  employee⇔manager [action: order/organise/control/coordinate/plan - relationship: 
the manager speaks on behalf of the employee]; 
4.  expert⇔idea [action: innovate/transform/inform/define/quantify - relationship: the 
expert speaks on behalf of the the idea. Examples include legal expert⇔law; 
engineer⇔technology; bureaucrat⇔policy, etc];  
5.  priest⇔god [action: dispense salvation/justice/fate/predictions/divine 
law/power/received wisdom - relationship: the priest speaks on behalf of an 
omnipresent, extrajudicial god].  
These voices are most often mixed in M3; they rarely appear alone. These relations need 
not imply ‘projection’ (Halliday, 1994, p. 219). Rather, they are the heteroglossic social 
                                                 
8 I am thinking especially of Bernstein and Labov, and before them, Firth, Gramsci, and Kenneth Burke. 
9 M3=Millenium three, or third millenium, policy language. I use this term because the language is 
unerringly futuristic. I like the sound of “M3” because it sounds like the nasty virus that the language is.  
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voices embedded within M3. They have been historically overlaid, as techniques of 
social control, one upon the other. The form of language that the convergence of these 
three modes of social domination takes - corporate managerialism, theorcracy, and 
technocracy - is neither pre-modern, modern, nor postmodern: it is totalitarian. M3 is 
characteristically shot through with blatant contadictions, closest to that which Orwell 
(1949/1981) termed doublethink. It attempts to grasp huge, abstract social trajectories in 
neologisms and euphemisms. Those are its main features. I will point out these and other 
regularities in the following analyses, at the same time showing how SFL can inform 
sociologal and anthropological analyses of the political field, a specific class of socially 
significant, well-defined doings.   
Text: Miller, R., Michalski, W., & Stevens, B. (1998). The promises and Perils of 21st 
Century technology: An overview of the issues (pp. 7-32). In Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD] (1998).  
The book from which this passage is cited - 21st Century Technologies: Promises 
and Perils of a  Dynamic Future - is concerned with predictions, as its title indicates 
(OECD, 1998). The predictive purpose of the text forces the authors into a series of 
irrealis proposals and propositions. The whole book sells a ‘vision’ of ‘socio-technical 
dynamism’ for the future of OECD countries (e.g. pp.7, 26, 32). The complexity of the 
language is well-evidenced in the strenuous nature of its verbal groups, and the 
extremely compressed nature of its nominalisations. I have gone about analysing these 
texts by firstly identifying central processes in major clauses, focusing on ‘role 
structures’ (Halliday, 1978, p. 143), to see what kinds of hierarchies the authors 
construe: I ask a simple “who or what gets to do what to what or whom?” question. For 
the most part, I have ignored marking circumstantial elements here, except where they 
become central to the textual metafunction. For the most part, circumstantial elements 
are concerned with situating the reader in an imagined future, which is usually construed 
as if it had already happened. Because of the high level of abstraction in these texts, and 
because of the nature of my theoretical framework, the analysis is mostly confined to 
ideational aspects of the discourse. I have used minimal bracketing to focus on central 
processes. Once the grammatical metaphors are translated, I then investigate the logical 
relations. In doing so, I partially follow the process set out by Halliday for dealing with 
ideational metaphors (1994, p. 343).  
Text 1: Central processes are marked in bold. Actors are underlined, [range is marked in 
square brackets in this typeface]. Carrier ^ Attribute and Token ^ Value relations are 
identified in bold inside triangular brackets, e.g. <carrier>, and the relational processes 
in these constructions are bolded and marked in [square brackets]. 
Twenty-five years from now, after more than five decades of development, the 
microprocessor, information technologies in general, and networks will probably have 
penetrated [every aspect of of human activity]. Many parts of the world <carrier> [will 
be] wired, responsive and interactive <attribute>. Beyond simply accelerating the pace 
of change or reducing the cost of many current activities, the use of these high-
performance digital tools opens up [the possibility of profound transformations]. (p. 10) 
1)  will probably have penetrated: Here we see a mild example of the complex tense 
structures demanded by the priestly predictions of M3. We have past [have 
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penetrated] in future [will], partially modalised by probably. The past-in-future 
construction construes the likelihood of the future state of affairs as “a done deal”, 
regardless of the modalisation. The choice of a material process [penetrated] sets up 
the Range function for the nominal group Actor in this clause [Actor: the 
microprocessor, information technologies in general, and networks]. The range 
specifies the scope of the process (Halliday, 1994, p. 146). In this case, the range is 
every aspect of of human activity. Clearly, the authors are making some ambitious 
predictions. As far as we humans are concerned, technology is a profoundly 
transformative, all-encompassing, exogenously acting phenomenon that will affect 
everything we do (seemingly regardless of what we do!).  
2)  will be: The intensive-attributive function is typical of M3 predictions and 
descriptions (cf. Graham, 1999a; McKenna & Graham, 1999). In this vision, Many 
parts of the world is the carrier of some rather vague attributes. It is as if, today, many 
parts of the world were not already wired, responsive and interactive. The act of 
predicting what already exists is an intrinsically sacramental form of renaming 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 120).  
3)  opens up: The abstract-material process again functions to define a range beyond that 
of simply accelerating the pace of change or reducing the cost of many current 
activities. The use of these high-performance digital tools is an abstract, process-like 
Actor that exceeds mere change by opening up the possibility of further change. But 
these further changes are profound. The circularity of M3 is evident here. The abstract 
Actor creates, not merely the speed of change, but the profound nature of change 
itself: it changes the nature of change from simplistic to profound. That the use of 
these technologies will speed up change and lower costs is given, no other possibility 
is entertained.  
These few sentences are fairly simple examples of M3 that highlight some of its basic 
features: its intention to sell (the benefits of technology, or of “socio-technical 
dynamism” in this case); its prophetic, priestly, and visionary nature (the world will be 
thus; such and such phenomena will be); its affinity with technology; its circularity 
(using technology will change change); its dependence on grammatical metaphor of an 
extremely abstract and ambitiously grasping nature (all areas of human activity; Many 
parts of the world; the use of these high-performance digital tools); and, especially, its 
reliance on authority. This is the key aspect of M3. An “unauthorised” person could not 
make such claims with much credibility, and these are mild in terms of the rest of the 
text.  
The strenuous demands of authoritative, irrealis descriptions of an inevitable 
future state upon Processes is best exemplified by the central verbal group in the 
following 62-word sentence:  
Virtual robots with fairly narrowly defined tasks, a type of expert software, will have 
reached the point of being able to track and respond to [many human needs, from 
the banal capacity of a networked toaster to identify users and recall their preferences to 
the more advanced functionality of e-mail screening, comparison shopping and 
assembling/tracking a person’s customised learning “adventures”]. (p. 11)  
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The effect of the central verbal group in this sentence is to set the tense system spiralling 
back and forth in a helical manner, from future to past to present and back again, to 
construe an imaginary phenomenon as if it had already happened in some bygone future. 
The historical heteroglot of authoritarian voices can also be identified here. This is a 
comfortingly consistent heteroglossic stew of authoritative statements: there are priestly 
predictions; experts expressing ideas and explaining them; the benefactor’s voice speaks 
condescendingly about the needs of people that will be catered to by virtual robots, a 
kind of mechanical knowledge slave; and the homey familiarity of a household appliance 
sales pitch are overlayed and embedded within each other, thus collapsing the 
authoritative voices of the whole of human history within a single sentence. And, this is 
without mentioning the poverty of the OECD’s ‘vision’ of what might constitute human 
needs. But these words are mere padding for the hard sell.  
 The text proceeds in a very similar manner to explain the benefits of genetic 
engineering: ‘By 2005, after fifteen years of intense activity, scientists should know [the 
full DNA sequence of a typical man or or woman]’ (p. 12)10; its uses: ‘Biotechnology 
applications are likely to pervade [most areas of activity] in the next quarter-century’ (p. 
13); and the risks of new technologies: They <carrier/Actor> could pose threats that 
will be [both powerful and difficult to control] <attribute/Range>’ (p. 14). This last sentence 
is an interesting construction because the verbal group highlights two evenly mixed 
functions. It conflates an abstract material [could pose threats: i.e. could threaten]  with 
a future intensive-attributive [that will be]. Thus, it actually projects a threat on behalf of 
technology’s potential by attributing the possibility of material consequences as Range, 
although the “who gets done to?” question is left unanswered. Another choice for this 
sentence could have been: They could pose powerful threats that will be difficult to 
control [for …?]  OR They could threaten to be powerful and difficult to control [for 
…?]. Whichever way this is translated, technology is construed, as is usual in M3 texts, 
as an exogenous, determinative force of nature that someone or something needs to tame 
and/or nurture, usually the policy unit putting the M3 together.  
 The hard sell comes after the authors describe several models of what future 
global governance might look like, especially as they relate to facilitating ‘socio-
technical dynamism’ (pp. 15-26). The authors highlight a clear imperative here: 
‘Reaping the rewards and reducing the dangers generated by technological advances 
depend on [a complex interaction with underlying economic, social and political conditions]’ (p. 
15). The abstract-material phrasal verb (Halliday, 1994, pp. 207-210), depend on, which 
functions as a circumstantial-relational process here, allows the nominal/verbal group 
Head (Act), which functions here as a nominal group Thing, to take up centre stage, as it 
were, whilst concealing the passivity of the sentence and its authoritarian imperative. A 
slightly more concrete translation of this thinly veiled imperative might be: A complex 
interaction [by someone or something] with underlying economic, social and political 
conditions [somewhere] will allow [someone or something] to reap the rewards and 
reduce the dangers of technological advances. This “someone or something” who 
wishes to interact, reap rewards, and reduce danger must read on to see what such 
complex interaction might entail, and what the qualifying economic, social and political 
                                                 
10 I have highlighted “typical” here to show the assumptions that the authors tend to make about people. 
Other such epithets include ‘prototypical’ and so on. 
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conditions might be. This extremely compressed sentence is a well-disguised 
authoritarian proposal: “If you want to benefit you must engage”. It leads, inevitably, to 
the self-valorising purpose that inheres in the language and logic of the political field:  
The political field is thus the site of a competition for power which is carried out by 
means of a competition for control of non-professionals or, more precisely, for the 
monopoly of the the right to speak and act in the name of some or all of the non-
professionals. (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 190)  
This monopolistic purpose is revealed in the imperative for a ‘global framework’ for 
managing technology (pp. 26-32). The Hyper-theme of a ‘global framework’ is 
introduced in the form of a hypothetical ‘question’ embedded within a nominal group. 
The question appears from nowhere, and is asked by nobody in particular, we are merely 
told that ‘it is important to examine the more general question of the of the relationship 
of global-level frameworks to socio-technical dynamism and resistance’ (Miller et. al., 
1998, p. 26). Resistance is set off here in binary opposition to socio-technical dynamism, 
the latter being desirable and the former undesirable. 
The shibboleth of ‘environmental sustainability’ is then pounded to produce a 
familiar tone: 
Environmental sustainability <token> [offers] one of the best examples of the 
divergent implications of realising (or not) global frameworks conducive to 
socio-technical transformation <value>. The first reason is that socio-technical 
progress <token> [is probably] an indispensable part of improving ecological 
outcomes without facing unacceptable trade-offs in terms of wealth or individual liberty 
<value>. Secondly, environmental sustainability <token> [is] the foremost example of 
two sets of externalities <value>: the cross-jurisdictional nature of pollution, and the 
probability that the overall social rates of return on investments in socio-technical 
change aimed at improving the environment are greater at a global level than at the 
country level <elaborated value>. (p. 27)   
We are told here why socio-technical transformation/progress is not only desirable but 
also necessary: because it is probably an indispensable part of improving ecological 
outcomes without facing unacceptable trade-offs in terms of wealth or individual liberty. 
Also, the prelude to a global governance imperative is laid out in the cross-jurisdictional 
nature of pollution and the overall social rates of return on investments in socio-
technical change aimed at improving the environment. In short, pollution is suddenly 
behaving like a transnational firm, and its technical solutions, because they are not so 
profitable, must be coordinated at an international level.  
We hear the mixed voices of corporate managerialism, neo-liberal politics, neo-
classical economics, and technocracy speaking here. The message is simple: “Unless we 
deploy new technologies at a global level to fix the environmental problems created by 
older technologies, wealth capacity and freedom will suffer, and this is unacceptable”. 
The key words here are outcomes, wealth, and individual liberty. Ecology - supposedly 
the “natural” environment - is viewed in terms of business outcomes. This reflects the 
attitudes of M3 towards the environment: it is merely another by-product of the free and 
rational individual’s “natural right” and natural freedom to pursue profit. “Managing for 
outcomes” is an increasingly familiar term, at least where the public sector is concerned. 
It is an historical extension of ‘management by objectives’ (cf. Dixon, 1996, chapt. 5). 
ASFLA 99- Phil Graham 
21 
MBO, the scientific administrator, and the technocrat: An historical aside 
The emergence of ‘scientific management’ and later, ‘management by objectives’ 
(MBO), as overarching approaches to doing business marks the point in human history at 
which the dicourses of the military, science, and managerialism merged into a coherent, 
“visionary” framework. F.W. Taylor (1856-1915) saw that the route to higher 
productivity in business was through ‘systematic soldiering’ on the part of workers led 
by rational, efficiency-focused managers (Dixon, 1996, p. 36). He saw that management 
ought to be conducted on the basis of ‘fact, on research and experimentation’ (p. 36). 
Alfred P. Sloan and Henry Ford extended his ‘vision’. Their efforts in car manufacturing 
manifested themselves in MBO (1996, chapt. 5). Obedience, strategic planning, 
quantifiable objectives, and a single-minded dedication to purpose became the way to a 
rosy future. These outcomes have, in recent history, become ends in themselves:  
The simple techniques of cocreation of meaning, of common obedience to the endorsed 
purpose, such techniques underlie performance and achievement … As we near the end 
of the 20th century, we are incrementally approaching this ideal. (Dixon, 1996, p. 10)   
Chester Barnard, a 1930s management “guru” from the Bell Telephone Company, 
outlined the technocratic imperatives of ‘administrative management’ to the Whitehouse. 
He was sure that government could be run along the same lines as business. His vision 
struck a chord for obvious reasons:  
canons of efficiency require the establishment of a responsible and effective chief 
executive as the center of energy, direction and administrative management; the 
systematic organization of all activities in the hands of qualified personnel...and 
appropriate staff agencies. There must also be provision for planning, a complete fiscal 
system and means for holding the executive accountable for his program. (Barnard, 
1937) 
Of course, combining “cocreation of meaning” - a purposive obedience to ideology - 
with imperatives for economic performance, “canons of efficiency”, technological 
advances, and objective political outcomes, like those expressed in the OECD text that I 
analyse here, has proven to be an historically disastrous mix. A little less than two years 
later, another outstanding administrator of the day, Josef Goebbels, praises the benefits 
of communication technologies, expressing similar values to those contained in 
Barnard’s ‘communicative’ imperatives for management:  
We live in an age that is both romantic and steel-like. While bourgeois reaction was 
alien and hostile to technology and modern sceptics believed the deepest roots of the 
collapse of European culture lay in it, National Socialism has understood how to take 
the soul-less framework of technology and fill it with the rhythm and hot impulses of 
our time. (Goebbels, 1939, in Bullock, 1991, p. 440) 
Friedman (1999) expresses a more realistic view of how these historically conflated  
discourses - rational managerialism, technocracy, militarism, and corporatism - relate to 
one another in today’s “global” context:  
The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – McDonald’s  
cannot flourish without McDonnel Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist 
that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States 
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Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. “Good ideas and technologies need a strong 
power that promotes those ideas by example and protects those ideas by winning on the 
battlefield,” says the foreign policy historian Robert Kagan. “If a lesser power were 
promoting our ideas and technologies, they would not have the global currency that they 
have. And when a strong power, the Soviet Union, promoted its bad ideas, they had a lot 
of currency for more than half a century.”(p. 84) 
Predictably, Friedman’s “pragmatic” view of global imperatives quickly gives way to the 
priestly pronouncements associated with globalisation (Graham, 1999a):  
I believe globalization did us all a favor by melting down the economies of Thailand, 
Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Brazil in the 1990’s because it laid 
bare a lot of rotten practices in the countries that had prematurely globalized. People 
keep referring to what happened in countries like Indonesia as an economic “crisis”. 
Well, excuse me, but I don’t consider the downfall of the most corrupt, venal, greedy, 
ruling family in the world – the Suhartos – a crisis. (p. 61) 
Apart from expressing the orthodox belief that “globalisation” is an active, virtuous, 
perhaps even conscious agent, Friedman reduces the sudden and violent deprivations of 
literally billions of people down to a “goodies versus baddies” Disney plot, the outcome 
of which can be shown to be a “good thing” because of its effect on a single despot and 
his family, however unfortunate its side-effects for the many ‘honest, hard-working folks 
who played by the rules’ may be (p. 61).  
But Speer (1970) best captures the trajectory of an expert, technological system 
dedicated solely to totalitarian social control:  
[I]n Hitler’s system, as in every totalitarian regime, when a man’s position rises, his 
isolation increases and he is therefore more sheltered from harsh reality: that with the 
application of technology to the process of murder the number of murderers is reduced 
and therefore the possibility of ignorance grows; that the craze for secrecy built into the 
system creates degrees of awareness, so it is easy to escape observing inhuman 
cruelties. (p. 170) 
This is the trajectory of techno-totalitarianism.  
The OECD’s global imperative: Analysis continued 
Miller et. al. (1998) state the inevitability of global government - management as 
they call it - a supranational monopoly of power, under the dual rubrics of effectiveness 
and efficiency:  
Ultimately, in light of increasing international interdependence, global as opposed to 
national-level approaches <token> [look set to become] the most effective way of 
addressing macro-level problems <value> [such as ensuring that stocks and bonds can 
be traded seamlessly worldwide, or that producers of intellectual property are 
compensated fairly and efficiently when someone uses their output] <elaborated 
value>. Indeed, one of the main macro-level obstacles to socio-technical dynamism 
<token> [is] the fact that available institutions are national or inter-nation(al) while 
many emerging challenges appear to require more holistic, global thinking <value>. As 
many analysts have pointed out, particularly with respect to future environmental 
sustainability, the shift towards more integrated, planet-wide initiatives will probably 
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accelerate as people come to recognise the enhanced benefits - both private and social - 
of action at a global level. 
Finally, converging economic, social and technological forces seem poised to create [a 
leap in both the importance and feasibility of global management]. (1998, pp. 28-29) 
What the authors are proposing here is an autonomous, global system of governance. In 
this section, the circumstantial elements become more important, mostly for rhetorical 
purposes. The circumstantial elements in this passage are treated as Given, even though, 
they are highly contestable. I have highlighted them here:  
Ultimately, in light of increasing international interdependence, global as opposed 
to national-level approaches look set to become the most effective way of addressing 
macro-level problems such as ensuring that stocks and bonds can be traded seamlessly 
worldwide, or that producers of intellectual property are compensated fairly and 
efficiently when someone uses their output. Indeed, one of the main macro-level 
obstacles to socio-technical dynamism is the fact that available institutions are 
national or inter-nation(al) while many emerging challenges appear to require 
more holistic, global thinking. As many analysts have pointed out, particularly with 
respect to future environmental sustainability, the shift towards more integrated, planet-
wide initiatives will probably accelerate as people come to recognise the enhanced 
benefits - both private and social - of action at a global level. 
Finally, converging economic, social and technological forces seem poised to create a 
leap in both the importance and feasibility of global management. (1998, pp. 28-29) 
The circumstantial elements are as abstract as the contents of the message, but in this 
section of the text they become premisses, whereas previously, they are concerned with 
positioning the reader in the authors’ imagined future. Here, in the monopolising 
propositions, the circumstances are construed as actual and existing, whether or not that 
is the case:  
- Ultimately, in light of increasing international interdependence;  
This sets the reader up as being “in the know” [we all know that nations are increasingly 
dependent on one another because of globalisation]. Notably, in this chapter, the authors 
do not use the word globalisation. Instead, they use terms like global framework; global 
economic system; global basis; global information transparency; global cooperation; 
planet-wide issues; tomorrow’s ever-“smaller” planet (e.g. pp. 26-27). Nevertheless, the 
circumstantial element, increasing international interdependence, intertextually refers 
the reader to globalisation. The terminological shift from “globalness” to 
“planetariness” is gradual but emphatic as the text moves to focus on environmental 
sustainability. In terms of ideational metaphor, we could say that “planet” is more easily 
associated with “environment” than is the more geometric epithet, “global”.  
- the fact that available institutions are national or inter-nation(al) while many 
emerging challenges appear to require more holistic, global thinking;  
This existing, factual circumstance is one of the main macro-level obstacles to socio-
technical dynamism. For that reason, in terms of appraisal (cf. Lemke, 1998; Martin, 
1998), it is judged to be an Undesirable circumstance [t: - desirability]. A 
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modulated proposal is contained within the circumstance: many emerging challenges 
appear to require more holistic, global thinking. This proposal frames the available 
institutions as being incapable of thinking or acting “holistically” or “globally”. The 
strenuous and seemingly unnecessary work in punctuating inter-nation(al) sets up a 
“conflict of interest” relationship between the global and national fora, emphasising the 
national agenda of such fora. Thus, it provides a metaphorically construed proposition: a 
forum that is set up among or between nations cannot separate its interests from national 
interests, competing or otherwise. Therefore, such a forum cannot think in an 
“authentically” holistic or global way. This requires specialised, autonomous global 
decision-making –impartial, disinterested; everybody benefits. This highly contentious 
proposition is explicitly construed as an incontrovertible fact. 
 
- as people come to recognise the enhanced benefits - both private and social - of 
action at a global level;  
Again, this future circumstance is construed as inevitable: people will recognise the 
enhanced benefits. This positions people as ignorant. In the current state of affairs, 
people don’t know what’s good for them. They need action at a global level, but they 
just don’t know it yet.  
- Finally, converging economic, social and technological forces ….  
Here, the authors conflate a priestly appeal to the God of neo-classical/neo-liberal 
ideology, “globalisation”, with a technocratically nominalised appeal to the “big ideas” 
that inhere in the expert realms of multilateral policy centres, a description of every force 
at work in the human macro-social environment (converging economic, social and 
technological forces) as the final arbiter of a seemingly immutable fate for global 
governance. Never mind that economy, society, and technology have been inextricably 
interwoven throughout history, inseparably. According to the authors, that is not the 
case. It is for them, rather, a recent phenomenon. These forces are now converging, as 
they say in the current jargon, and thus we must stand aside for the global 
Ubermenschen, the only people qualified to act in such circumstances. This is most 
clearly evidenced when they make the claim that ‘[t]he current base of the pyramid upon 
which global frameworks rest could begin to crumble [as socio-technical dynamism 
disrupts existing patterns of assuring global cohesion] (p. 27). The Platonic, authoritarian 
assumptions and imperatives are obvious here: if populations are not kept in line, 
international fora (the peak of the global social pyramid) could cease to exist.  
Tangential observations about M3 texts 
Tangent 1: M3’s evaluative lexis  
  The genre of multilateral policy statements is dependent on technical expertise 
for its authority (Lemke, 1995; McKenna & Graham, forthcoming). Consequently its 
evaluative lexis is usually limited, or at least must be inferred. During this analysis, it 
occurred to me that much of the overt evaluative lexis occurred in the processes. Where 
overt, non-processual appraisals occur, they are usually collocated with nominalisations 
that attempt to grasp huge social trajectories. Appraisal (Martin, in press) in M3 is 
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mostly concerned with construing  Importance and Desirability (Lemke, 1998). Here are 
some examples of the non-Processual appraisal lexis used in Miller et. al. (1998):  
– many profound technological, economic and social transformations [t: 
importance]; 
– the path of such prodigious change [t: importance]; 
– the risks to cherished traditions [t: desirability]; 
– The exploration and manipulation of these two building blocks [digital and genetic 
information] … are likely to unlock vast treasures [t: desirability]; 
– a strong virtuous circle between better information and higher performance tools 
[t: desirability]; 
– the information transformed into zeros and ones are allowing rapid advances to be 
made [t: desirability/importance]; 
– Faster, cheaper, smaller are more than slogans for the highly competitive 
information technology sector [t: desirability]; 
– the prospects for the key component of computing technology - the microprocessor - 
look very promising [t: desirability]; 
– the production process is less wasteful [t: desirability]. 
Processes as evaluative resources in M3 
As the text progresses, the authors begin to use Processes that are heavily 
weighted in terms of their appraisal value (Martin, 1998). It appears that the authors do 
this once they feel they have established the “technological progress is an unmitigated 
good” message. These value-weighted processes appear, firstly, with a slight polar spin, 
but as the text progresses, they reach polar extremes that are entirely concerned with 
construing [+ -] Desirability or Importance. In the following examples, Processual 
evaluations resources are marked in bold and italic, other evaluative resources are 
marked in italics:  
– There is no one best formula for encouraging socio-technical dynamism [t: + 
desirability]; 
– … those [framework conditions] that are more linear and remain entrenched in 
existing patterns [t: - desirability];  
– The search for solutions to social problems also succumbed to the production 
methods and product design methods of the automotive era [t:- desirability]; 
– a transformative paradigm that propelled productivity forward and inspired major 
technological advances [t: + desirability]; 
– the Internet could pioneer a significantly different vision of work and society [t: + 
desirability]; 
– the Internet has eclipsed most proprietary EDI systems [t: + importance]; 
– a powerful economic imperative is unleashed by the Internet’s technology [t: + 
importance]; 
– an overall increase in the exclusivity of intellectual property might end up crippling 
both the development and the diffusion of new technologies, and generate seriously 
negative consequences at the macro level [t: - desirability]; 
– Protectionism, social strife, intolerance and even hatred or open conflict might be 
inflamed by have-nots within and between countries [t: - desirability]; 
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– This [impeded socio-technical dynamism] in turn might provoke the kind of vicious 
as opposed to virtuous spiral that ends up further exacerbating problems such as 
inequality, envronmental degradation and global tension [t: - desirability];  
– differences might be exacerbated and the crucially important global agreements 
could either disintegrate or fail to emerge [t: - desirability]; 
– Many people welcome the prospect of technological innovation offering such 
bountiful possibilities for the twenty-first century [t: + desirability];  
Tangent: Metaform in M3   
 I will introduce a term here: Metaform. I define this as the overall structure of the 
text as it moves towards its rhetorical purpose [e.g. “socio-technical dynamism is good 
for you, therefore you need us to run the world to make sure it happens”]. I have no data 
to support the existence of such forms in spoken language, but in the written data I have 
analysed, M3 policy statements apears to take a specific Metaform [examples from Miller 
et. al. are marked in square brackets with page (p.#) and sentence (S:#) numbers where 
necessary]:  
– Context: statement of historical importance of the text [Over the past century there 
have been many profound technological, economic and social transformations (p. 7, S:1)];  
– Production process: the manner and context in which the 
statements/solutions/objectives were reached. This is roughly equivalent to the 
methodology section in an academic thesis, and may be explicitly such for M3 
internal documents [working papers, internal reports, conference proceedings, etc], 
although an explicit statement of “methodology” is rare in documents designed for 
external consumption [The OECD Forum for the Future Conference on 21st Century 
Technologies was no exception; all of these perspectives were analysed and discussed (p. 
7)]11; 
– Overview: overview of the message structure [This introductory chapter is divided into 
three sections … (p. 8)]; 
– Elemental descriptions: broad descriptions of Participants, Processes, and 
Circumstances that are central to the stated purpose of the text. These are, typically, 
the most abstract and ambitious types of descriptions, if one can make such a 
comparison in terms of degrees [Imagining possible applications of technology two or three 
decades from now calls for a better understanding of the ways in which performance trends 
interact with societies’ readiness to embrace economic, social and technical change (p. 8)]; 
– Detailed descriptions of elements: The majority of M3 texts are concerned with 
defining and/or describing the Participants, Processes, and Circumstances that are 
most abstractly defined in the Elemental description stage, which is usually fairly 
short. This best evidenced by the headings in section 1 of the Miller et. al. text: 
[Information technologies - Performance (p. 9); Uses (p. 10); Biotechnologies - 
Performance (p. 11); Uses (p. 13); Risks associated with advances in new 
technologies (p. 14)];  
– Problematising Circumstances (Utopia ^ Dystopia): M3 is mainly concerned with, 
and premissed upon, broad, fuzzy global circumstantial trajectories (eg 
                                                 
11 We are, of course, not told how or by whom these issues - ‘preservation versus dynamism, 
incrementalism versus radicalism’ (p. 7) - were discussed. We are told, though, that the conference is 
sponsored by ‘Expo 2000 and four German banks’ (p. 3).  
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“globalisation”; “socio-technical dynamism”, etc). The ineffability of these objects 
places great stains on M3 authors who must give reasons for making their 
extraordinarily vague and ambitious claims. Thus, the authors generally spend some 
effort defining at least one “big” benefit and one “big” disadvantage in terms of the 
Circumstantial outcomes of policy decisions [If the risks can be managed, it is plausible 
that over the next twenty five years a panoply of technological advances will vastly improve 
human welfare as well as help set the world’s development on a sustainable course (p. 15)]. 
This big advantage is set off against the ‘risks’of not realising it: [Micro, macro and 
global framework conditions can thus be seen as either favouring or impeding technological 
dynamism (p. 16)]. Thus, if technological advances can vastly improve human 
welfare, and so on, anything that impedes this circumstance is obviously a problem; 
– Solution: The “solution”, like the one I have exemplified above calling for 
autonomous global governance, is usually more about maintaining the field of power 
within which the text is produced than solving any substantive question of social, 
political, or economic importance. In this respect, the problematising circumstances 
section of the text is almost always presented as a threat that only the specific field of 
power can solve: [As Luc Soete points out in his contribution to this volume, establishing 
effective global framework conditions will probably play a decisive role in the development 
and diffusion of many technological breakthroughs over the next twenty-five years]. As I 
have shown above, this probably becomes inevitably as the “solution” plays itself out; 
– Conclusion: In M3 policy statements, the conclusion is a policy strategy, a way to 
reach specific outcomes defined in the course of solving defined problems. The 
conclusion of the Miller et. al. text, like those of M3 in general, is thus to increase the 
importance of the field in which the text is produced.  
Conclusion 
In the text I have analysed here, Miller et. al. (1998) announce a new direction 
for the OECD and, perhaps, other established multilateral fora, in terms of their self-
defined mandate: they construe the necessity and inevitability of autonomous global 
governance. Their claims are premissed on the effects technology, financial markets, and 
globalisation - the holy trinity of the globalist ideology - on national governments 
(Graham, 1998). The goal of ‘socio-technical dynamism’, a state of permanent 
technologically determined change, is construed as an end in itself.  
 
In terms of how SFL shapes up as a method for social analyses - sociology, 
anthropology, and communication - this analysis highlights SFL’s inbuilt theoretical 
ability to cope with a particular field, the field of power, and relate it to social 
trajectories, as well as provide insight into the assumptions, traditions, structure, and 
trajectory, both in the field in which the text is produced, and in terms of the text’s 
representations of the global social milieux to which it refers. The analysis highlights an 
anomaly in the very existence and function of M3 discourse and, for that matter, policy 
statements in general: they are themselves a form of sociology. They comment on 
society; they produce a ‘theory effect’ (Bourdieu, 1991) within society; they reflect a 
particular view of society, and thus “membership” of a particular discourse community; 
and they present a certain view of society. They engage in definitions and classifications. 
They define the meaning of power from a powerful position. In this respect, such policy 
statements - like any languagings - are part of reality, shapers of reality, and metaphors 
for reality (cf. Halliday, 1978, 1994). 
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 M3 looks likely to burn out as a genre, or as an epidemic, depending on how you 
views it. I say this because of its bloated appearance and outrageous intent. Having 
largely defined the policy agendas of world governments since the early 1960s, the field 
in which these texts are produced now seems intent on breaking away from its 
international roots in a bid for complete autonomy. The very real negative circumstances 
that are becoming increasingly prominent and pervasive throughout the world - war, 
human atrocities, terrorism, slavery, and social inequality, to name just a few - are 
increasing as a result of the multilateral, “one-system-to-fit-all” approach that is 
characteristic of M3 (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1998, 1999a; Saul, 1992, 1997).  
Social science and SFL need each other. In many respects, they are each other. I 
say this knowing that it is a contentious and sweeping statement. But if social science is 
not dynamic, systemic, functional, and self-aware in terms of the language it uses, it 
risks descending into a narrow, positivist, formalism of decontextualised descriptions 
which, at least from a linguistic perspective, is described succinctly by Martin (1998). Of 
course, such formalisms are not confined to linguistics. They can be identified in all 
areas of social science and they are a function of flawed socio-epistemology, which is 
also a function of language. These, too, are found throughout the social sciences and 
threaten to be at the root of its impending implosion.  
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